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MULTINATIONALS REVISITED 
elohn M. Niehuss* 
STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS-THE REAL ISSUES. By 
Raymond Vernon. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
1977. Pp. vii, 260. $12.50. 
So much has been published on multinational corporations 
in recent years that one is inclined to pass over any new book on 
the subject for one in a more topical, less examined area. It would, 
however, be a mistake to miss Professor Vernon's Storm over the 
Multinationals-The Real Issues. This is not just another book on 
multinationals. It is the readable and carefully researched effort 
of one of the world's acknowledged experts on multinationals. As 
such, it deserves to be studied by anyone remotely interested in 
the future of international business. 
Vernon has written extensively on multinationals, and his 
major work, Sovereignty at Bay, contributed to the concern in the 
early 1970s that multinationals were about to overwhelm the na-
tions of the world. 1 His objective in writing yet another book on 
multinationals was "to help the reader who is trying to keep his 
head above the flood" (p. v.). The book does just that; and it is 
unfortunate that it, rather than Sovereignty at Bay, did not ap-
pear earlier, as its measured approach might have helped mini-
mize the unsupported polemic and near hysteria over multina-
tionals in the early 1970s. 
Since those days, the controversy over multinationals has so 
waned that C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Trea-
sury: could note: "Fortunately, popular alarm over the power 
and growth of multinational firms has substantially abated dur-
ing the past few years. It is now recognized-for better or for 
worse-that most governments are able to deal effectively with 
these firms. Hysteria over the 'global reach' of multinationals is 
much abated."2 In this relatively quiet atmosphere, the turmoil 
and turbulence of "the MNC issue" in the early 1970s is often 
forgotten; a capsule review of recent history may help put Ver-
* Member, New York and Ohio Bars. B.A. 1958, Amherst College; J.D. 1962, Univer• 
sity of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971). 
2. "The International Investment Policy of the United States," Remarks by the Hon. 
C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs before the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, N.Y., reprinted in Dept. of Treasury News 
Release B-1262 at 6 (Nov. 14, 1978). 
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non's analysis in better perspective. 
Scholars first intensified their study of the multinationals in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. 3 The American labor movement 
picked up the issue in the early 1970s and pushed the Burke-
Hartke Bill as a means to minimize the alleged evils of the multi-
nationals;' business responded by proposing codes of good con-
duct for corporations and governments. 5 Legislative bodies also 
began hearings and other investigations on multinational acti-
vities, 6 while governnients7 and international organizations8 
established task forces, special commissions, and advisory com-
mittees. All of this activity created what Vernon aptly calls the 
"storm" over the multinationals. For several years, opponents 
and defenders of multinationals traded charges and counter-
3. For a general discussion of the basic legal issues see Hadari, The Structure of the 
Priuate Multinational Enterprise (pt. 1), 71 MICH. L. R.Ev. 729 (1973); Hadari, The Choice 
of Law Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such 
Enterprises (pt. 2), 1974 DUKE L.J. 1; Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National 
Souereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW AND POLY. !NTL. Bus. 1 (1971); Vagts, The Multi-
national Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739 (1970). 
For bibliographies of works on multinational corporation issues see S. LEA & S. WEBLEY, 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1973); Centre on Transnational 
Corporations, Survey of Research on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/3 
(1977). 
4. Proposed Foreign Trade and Investment Act of 1972, S. 2592, H.R. 10914, 92d 
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-1972). See 117 CONG. REc. 33,583 for an introductory state-
ment by Senator Hartke and a summary of the Burke-Hartke proposals. See also 1972 
Economic Report and the President, Part I, Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 
2d Sess. 181-90 (1972) (discussion by Arthur Burns). · 
5. In November 1972 the Council of the International Chamber of Commerce adopted 
a set of comprehensive "Guidelines for International Investment" which dealt with many 
of the multinational-related issues being discussed and debated at the time. 
6. E.g., A Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970's, Hearings on the Multinational 
Corporation and International Inuestment Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Econ. Policy 
of the Joint Econ. Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Multinational Corporations and 
United States Foreign Policy, Hearings on the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. 
and Chile, 1970-71, Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973); U.S. TARIFF COMM. REPORT TO 
THE COMM. ON FINANCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND ITS SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE, 930 CONG,, 1ST SESS., ON lMPIJCATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE 
AND lNvESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND LABOR (Comm. Print 1973). 
7. E.g., U.S. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL lNvESTMENT, Tm: MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TION-STUDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN lNvESTMENT (March 1972); TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE 
OF CANADIAN OOUSTRY, REPORT ON FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN 
INDUSTRY (1968) (also known as the Watkins Report); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN 
DIRECT lNvESTMENT IN CANADA (1972) (also known as the Gray Report). 
8. See, e.g., Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations 
in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECN190 (1973); Department of Economic & Social 
Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International 
Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1-ST/ESN6 (1974). 
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charges, and thousands of man-hours were consumed arguing 
the pros and cons of the question. Storm over the Multinationals 
would have been a useful addition to this debate as it helps 
"filter out the polemic and the propaganda" (p. v) and provides 
an analytic framework that abhors cliches and identifies the truly 
unique aspects of a business operating simultaneously in several 
countries. 
Vernon's basic premise is that the tension between multina-
tionals and nations is caused by two completely different sets of 
problems which should be analyzed separately (pp. 11-12). The 
first set includes those broad structural and political problems 
arising out of the smaller and more interdependent world which 
improved communications, travel, computers, and technology 
have created. This smaller world has led to rising nationalism, 
efforts of various countries to assert economic hegemony, and a 
number of problems associated with increased economic interde-
pendence and industrialization (pp.191-93). Vernon believes that 
the multinational corporation has regrettably symbolized these 
problems because many wrongly believe that the multinationals 
produced them. In fact, the existence of multinationals is due, in 
large part, to the same basic factors which have created the new 
structural and political problems. As Vernon notes, the multina-
tional is "much more a manifestation of the trend than a cause" 
(p. 212). Since these problems are not caused by multinationals, 
Vernon argues, it is wrong to try to cure them by restraining 
multinationals. In short, he implies that much of the "storm" 
over the multinationals results from blaming multinationals for 
problems they did not create and that our fascination with the 
multinational corporation may keep us from solving the broader, 
basic problems economic interdependence and industrialization 
cause. 
On the other hand, Vernon does recognize a second set of 
problems which can be attributed to the growth, structure, and 
strategies of the multinational corporation (p. 212). The fact that 
the multinational operates simultaneously in home and host na-
tions gives it a "split personality" or a "double identity." Many 
multinational business strategies combine with this multina-
tional character to create conflicts with the countries in which 
they operate. Vernon discusses three illustrative multinational 
strategies: the desire to innovate to increase sales and profits; the 
drive to maintain stability in the face of competitive challenges 
to market position; and the attempt to avoid corporate decline 
when faced with potential new entrants to the corporation's mar-
ket. As Vernon explains in some detail, decisions implementing 
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these strategies cause problems in the home and host countries 
over (1) the location of research and development projects and the 
manufacture of new products, (2) the tendency to spread opera-
tions over many products and many countries in order to main-
tain corporate stability, and (3) the practice of combatting en-
tropy by surrendering old product lines and starting new ones. 
Within developed countries, the tensions between multina-
tionals and home and host countries are particularly acute for 
such areas and issues as national security, employment security, 
labor relations and collective bargaining, transfer pricing and the 
allocation of costs and profits for tax purposes, balance-of-
, payments and capital-movement policy, antitrust, and allocating 
access to raw materials. When the multinational operates in de-
veloping countries, it faces a somewhat greater degree of national-
ism and frequently becomes the subject of ideological and politi-
cal debates over such issues as the new international economic 
order, permanent sovereignty over natural resources, economic 
imperialism, the evils of capitalism and industrialization, appro-
priate technology, and the proper division of the benefits of mul-
tinational activities. 
Because nations frequently have conflicting goals, the mul-
tinational corporation is often trapped in what is essentially a 
disagreement between nations. A multinational must often juggle 
the claims of national sovereigns through its corporate decisions 
and actions. Vernon sees this as a unique problem and feels that 
many of the recent efforts to ease the tension between multina-
tionals and nations have been ineffective because by inade-
quately considering this dilemma of conflicting jurisdiction they 
ignore the basic causes of such tension. When trying to devise 
"solutions" to "multinational problems," Vernon suggests, the 
broader set of structural and political problems (e.g., economic 
interdependence and industrialization) cannot be solved by any 
program aimed at the multinational enterprise alone (pp. 211-
12). Of those problems directly related to multinationals, con-
flicting jurisdiction is the most serious and immediate. 
To cope with this problem and to help prevent an eruption 
of beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the multinational and 
international-investment areas, he suggests: (1) that national 
authorities agree about the nature of needed public action; (2) 
that national jurisdictions relating to multinational corporations 
be disentangled and redirected; and (3) that an acceptable inter-
national regime be created (pp. 211-16). 
Vernon feels that the current position of most developing 
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countries will prevent an early consensus about what public ac-
tion is needed. He believes that peer pressure forces those coun-
tries to maintain hostility toward multinationals which prevents 
them from "bargaining realistically" in devising any interna-
tional regime which, to be acceptable, would require them to 
assume new obligations as well as receive new benefits (p. 214). 
Thus, he concludes that, for the time being, any effective inter-
national cooperation must be among the developed countries, 
and his starting point for discussing such cooperation is the 
problem of conflicting national jurisdictions (p. 214). 
In Sovereignty at Bay, Vernon outlined his recommendations 
for a series of international commitments to reduce the problem 
of overlapping jurisdiction. He recommended (1) agreements by 
governments to give up the right to reach into the jurisdiction of 
others to influence actions that they feel affect their national 
interests; (2) international consultations to harmonize law and 
policy in areas like restrictive business practices, extraterritorial 
application of national security controls, and capital movements; 
(3) that governments of parent companies deny diplomatic sup-
port for foreign subsidiaries; and (4) finding a means of ensuring 
equitable treatment by host countries of foreign subsidiaries that 
would no longer be protected by the governments of their home 
state.9 Unfortunately, Storm over the Multinationals adds little 
to these recommendations, and the reader is left uncertain pre-
cisely how Vernon would treat some of the major problems of 
"disentangling" national jurisdictions. Fortunately, in a recent 
article in Foreign Policy, 10 Vernon expands on some of the ideas 
first set forth in Sovereignty at Bay, and one can now piece to-
gether a reasonably clear picture of his proposals. For example, 
in his Foreign Policy article he suggests that home-country gov-
ernments should accept the principle that all foreign-owned sub-
sidiaries lie wholly within the jurisdiction of the host country and 
host governments should treat all such subsidiaries as national 
enterprises. He adds that developing countries (including those 
in Latin America) might be willing to give up the Calvo doctrine 
(under which the laws of the host country, not international law, 
govern disputes over foreign-owned subsidiaries) and to agree to 
give foreign owners access to an international tribunal in return 
for a commitment by the United States and other industrialized 
9. R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 280. 
10. Vernon, The Multinationals: No Strings Attached, 33 FOREIGN POLY. 121 (1978-
1979). 
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countries to "orphan" foreign subsidiaries by refusing them diplo-
matic protection, not exercising extraterritorial control over 
them, and refraining from using them to intervene in the politics 
of other countries.11 
Professor Vernon closes Storm over the Multinationals by 
asserting that we need an "acceptable international regime" for 
the multinational corporation. It is a frustrating place for an ex-
cellent book to leave an interested reader. Having come so far, the 
reader might realistically expect at least· an outline of the kind 
of regime Vernon believes necessary .. That Vernon closed 
Sovereignty at Bay on a similar note is all the more reason for the 
reader to expect some further discussion. 
Vernon does make clear his belief that codes of conduct like 
the one negotiated with the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development and being negotiated in the United 
Nations are not very useful because they do not deal with the real 
problems multinationals create. He believes that the drafters of 
such codes misunderstand the problem, which is the conflict be-
tween the global strategy of the multinational a.nd the overlap-
ping jurisdictions and differing objectives of the home and host 
nations (p. 215).12 However, Storm over the Multinationals would 
have been far more useful had Vernon commented more specifi-
cally on the current OECD and UN attempts to regulate multina-
tionals and had he evaluated more completely other proposals 
concerning international investment (such as a GA TI for invest-
ment, 13 an "escape clause" for investment, 14 an International Cor-
poration Consultation Group, 15 a series of mini-codes in several 
different areas,16 and a Charter for Global Corporations17). 
In fairness to Vernon, his views on most of these proposals 
are set forth in his other works. For example, in Sovereignty at 
Bay he dismisses the global corporation as "assuming the prob-
11. Id. at 129-32. 
12. In addition, see id. at 133. 
13. See Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GA TT for Investment: A Proposal for 
Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POLY. lNTL. Bus. 295 (1970). 
14. See Bergsten, Discussion, The Multinational Firm: Bane or Boom?, 28 J. FINANCE 
457, 461-62 (1973); C. BERGSTEN, T. HORST & T. MORAN, AMERICAN MULTINATIONALS AND 
AMERICAN INTERESTS 467-72 (1978). 
15. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 36. 
16. See INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 16 (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as EcoNOMIC REPORT]. 
17. See Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 CoLUM. J. WoRLD Bus. 
25 (1967). But see Rubin, Corporations and Society: The Remedy of Federal and Interna-
tional Incorporation, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 263 (1973). 
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lem away,"18 and in his recent article in Foreign Policy one also 
glimpses the kind of international regime he may have in mind. 
In that article he notes: 
What will eventually be required is the creation of a set of new 
institutions at the international level that will collectively cover 
the whole range of major relationships between business and gov-
ernment from drug labeling and pollution to taxes and competi-
tion. 
Once the problem is perceived in its full dimensions, it will be 
possible to face the disconcerting fact that each major subject may 
call for a separately tailored institutional approach. After all, 
within any national system, governments pursue their tax prob-
lems through one set of institutions, their competition problems 
through another, their drug-labeling requirements through an-
other, their environmental controls through still another, and so 
on.•9 
Ironically, this overall approach resembles the response of the 
United States government in 1973-1974 to moves in the OECD 
and the UN toward a single code of conduct for all multinational 
activities. At that time, the United States urged the OECD to (1) 
accept the principle of national treatment as the basis for regulat-
ing foreign investors, (2) review national investment policies (e.g., 
subsidies, tax incentives, and procurement regulations) that dis-
tort trade and investment patterns, and (3) begin to treat the 
problems raised by multinationals in the established, specialized 
OECD committees on taxation, restrictive business practices, 
technology, and information disclosure.20 Unfortunately, the 
United States eventually acquiesced in a single multinational 
code within the OECD, and the other members of the OECD 
refused to accept any meaningful guidelines on national treat-
ment and investment incentives. The result was the OECD 
"Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises," which, as Vernon 
notes, "still leave largely unresolved most of the underlying prob-
lems" (p. 203). 
A clear presentation of an "acceptable international regime" 
to deal with multinational issues would, I have said, have been 
especially useful during the near hysteria of the early 1970s. On 
the other hand, multinationals still exist-a bit more enlight-
ened, perhaps, and certainly subject to increased public scrutiny 
and regulation. Nations are still sovereign and are presumably 
18. R. VERNON, supra note 1, at 272. 
19. Vernon, supra note 10, at 133-34. 
20. See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 16, at 15-16. 
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wiser and better informed as to the problems the multinationals 
present. There are, moreover, still a few reminders of the earlier 
turbulence. For example, the OECD "Guidelines" will be re-
viewed in June 1979; the Inter-Governmental Working Group on 
a Code of Conduct established by the United Nation's Commis-
sion on Transnational Corporations is expected to produce a draft 
code in early 1979; and substantial agreement has been reached 
on an UNCTAD International Code of Conduct on the Transfer 
of Technology. 
Furthermore, controversial issues in international economics 
appear incapable of permanent solution; they have ways of briefly 
disappearing and suddenly reappearing. For example, waves of 
protectionism periodically sweep the United States and other 
industrialized nations; concerns over foreign investment in the 
United States seem to rise and fall in roughly twenty-year cycles; 
and there are recurring efforts to reform the world's international 
monetary system. In the international investment area, the ITO 
and GATT Conferences in 1947 and 1948 discussed rules designed 
to regulate the restrictive business practices of companies doing 
business abroad; and in the early 1950s ECOSOC proposed a set 
of international antitrust rules. Neither the ITO Havana Charter 
nor the ECOSOC rules were adopted, and international direct 
investment and multinational issues were almost ignored until 
the latest wave of attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Thus, history suggests that the present calm is simply a lull be-
fore another storm of activity over international investment and 
multinationals. 
One should not dwell too much on Vernon's failure to outline 
an appropriate international regime more precisely or to evaluate 
the many proposals for controlling multinationals. Vernon clearly 
and admirably achieves his own goal by giving us a reasoned 
"large perspective" on multinationals. I hope, though, that Ver-
non will soon give another of his now regular encores so that, when 
the multinational storm clouds appear again, we will have the full 
benefit of his recommendations on an international regime. 
